Wednesday, May 15, 2024

Metamorphosis of a Monarch?

Jonathan Jones, "Jonathan Yeo’s portrait of Charles III review – a formulaic bit of facile flattery"
A psychedelic sea of lurid reds and a clunking monarch butterfly cannot save this superficially observed and carelessly executed bland banality

t’s hard to be objective about an artist you like as a person. I recently met the painter Jonathan Yeo – whose portrait of King Charles has been unveiled in a storm of crimson hype – on a radio show and was instantly charmed. It’s easy to see why famous people enjoy being portrayed by Yeo. He’s intelligent, relaxed, unassuming. We talked about a studio visit. But then I had a look at his works online and cringed. And that was before I saw this right royal banality.

Yeo’s portrait of the king is replete with all his vices. It is technically superficial and unfelt. There’s no insight into the king’s personality here, just a weird allegory about a monarch butterfly that Yeo says is a symbol of his metamorphosis from prince to king.

Nice flattery. So it’s no surprise King Charles is said to be pleased with his first official portrait since being crowned. As he courageously copes with cancer, who’d begrudge any pleasure this glowing red homage gives good old King Charles? But the pleasing effect of joy and uplift as Charles’s red military uniform melds with a pinkish psychedelic splurge is bought at the price of any genuine artistic perceptiveness or purpose.

Yeo’s art is formulaic and this one follows the formula. He does a pedantic study of someone’s features then – daringly! – collides this staid depiction with a free burst of lurid abstract wallpaper. He did Cara Delevingne in a vague subaqua setting and Taron Egerton in purple and pink rain. To me this is an evasion of actual portraiture which is based on acute, hard observation.

Royalists are never going to want portraits that look at their idols too astutely. Only one great artist in recent times has been allowed near a royal head: Lucian Freud’s searching, cruelly honest portrait of Queen Elizabeth II will never be loved by sentimentalists because it dares to treat the regal personage as just another person. And to be fair, Yeo too has seen Charles in the same way he sees everyone – blandly. I would say his portrayal of that kindly face adds nothing to what we see of Charles in photos and TV images, except that isn’t fair to photographers and camera people who often capture awkward, complex moments in the royal interaction with reality. Even the deferential coverage of the accession gave us those less than jolly glimpses of Charles infuriated by a pen.

It’s tempting to laugh at this painting, but if you care about art it’s a bit sad too. Yeo seems to be saying that painting itself is just a cheery bit of fakery and razzle dazzle. Who cares about truth when you can beautify? A serious portrait would look hard and long at Charles (or anyone), not combine facile pseudo-portraiture with the cheery serotonin of random colour. We all know the king is more complex than this. The king knows he is more complex than this. It is a masterpiece of shallowness by an artist so ludicrously upbeat he should be called Jonathan Yo!
 

Get thee to a tattoo parlour, Charles.  Buterflies?  Really? 

Charles wants to be "seen" as a "person" with "helping hands", and NOT as a king!  He's a 100% Virtue Signal....@@

Lucian Freud, Queen Eleizabeth II
See the Crown Charles?  Now THAT's a Monarch!

Monday, May 13, 2024

The Alpha & Omega of Painting as Art


 Gustav Courbet, "L'Origine du Monde" (1866)

Kazimir Malevich, "Black Square" (1915)

Inspiration
Dale Berning Sawa, "Hurrah for the Courbet vandals: defacing the vulva painting is basic feminism"
The performer who wrote ‘MeToo’ on Gustave Courbet’s The Origin of the World is right to think the painting is misogynistic: the model doesn’t even have a face!

On Monday afternoon, a group of feminist artist-activists tagged “MeToo” in red paint on Gustave Courbet’s L’Origine du Monde. Currently on loan to the Centre Pompidou-Metz for an exhibition dedicated to the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, the painting is a notoriously tight close-up of an unnamed woman’s vulva. It has never not been startling. It operates as a kind of social lightning conductor, consistently illuminating the invisibility women too often experience – in art as in life.

Luxembourgeois artist Deborah de Robertis, who is also exhibiting in the show, has claimed authorship of the action. Its title, she’s said, is On Ne Sépare Pas La Femme de l’Artiste, which translates as “You do not separate the woman from the artist.”

The response, from both the political and the artistic establishments, has been hostile. The museum condemned it as an act of vandalism, the mayor as a criminal attack perpetrated by fanatical feminists. Two women have been arrested.

This comes after several actions by Just Stop Oil at which famous paintings were attacked. Yet to me there is a difference between throwing tomato soup at a famous painting of sunflowers and a feminist artist tagging the anti-misogyny battle cry of the 21st century on to a painting famous for reducing the woman it depicts to her sexual organ. She doesn’t even have a face.
The woman in the painting never lost her head. She was there all along – all of her. Saying so really matters
In 2013, when a male Courbet expert “confirmed” that a newly discovered painting of a head was actually that of this model (it wasn’t), he reportedly said that making the woman whole essentially devalued Courbet’s work. “The Origin of the World loses that kind of marvellous mystery and symbolism from the moment you stick a head on it – that’s why Courbet took it off.”

By contrast, when an art writer once commented to the art historian and altogether more feminist Courbet expert Linda Nochlin, that, given the angle Courbet had chosen, it shouldn’t be possible to see the woman’s left breast, Nochlin lay on the floor (with her clothes on) to demonstrate, with her whole own female body that, actually, it really is.

Lacan owned the painting for three decades but hid it behind a custom-made wooden screen. Until the late 1980s, even experts doubted it still existed. All anyone knew of it were historic accounts by pundits who’d seen it and been revulsed (not by Courbet’s skill but by the body part on display) and reproductions in black and white. These were so grainy that Nochlin highlighted how indistinguishable this made the work from basic newsstand porn.

Before she finally secured the loan of the painting for the Brooklyn Museum’s seminal Courbet Reconsidered show in 1988, Nochlin wrote a whole paper about the efforts to locate it. She noted the Freudian import of both the title and of her quest to find the original Origin. She described how prehistoric depictions of vulvas have been said to be at the origin of art itself. She concluded that the search for lost origins leads to blindness.

De Robertis’s work homes in on an altogether more urgent blindness. You could say that her point, with this performance, is that the woman in the painting never lost her head or her name. She was there all along – all of her. And that saying so really matters.

The artist’s detractors on social media have been piling on the insults: she’s a degenerate, an idiot. But among the other works the performance targeted is a work of her own. A photograph titled Miroir de l’Origine du Monde (Mirror of the Origin of the World), documents a performance she did in 2014, wherein she sat beneath Courbet’s painting, in situ at the Musée d’Orsay, and exhibited her own vulva until the police intervened.

It’s a considered, confronting gesture that she has repeated in other charged locations (in front of the Mona Lisa; at the Grotto of Apparitions in Lourdes, where the Virgin Mary is said to have appeared in 1858). And each time, just as activist group Femen do with their topless actions, it is a great big shout to not look away, not deny women their wholeness, their right just to be.

In 2016 Swedish graphic artist Liv Strömquist’s best selling comic, Fruit of Knowledge: the Vulva vs the Patriarchy, was translated into French, under the title, you guessed it, L’Origine du Monde. The Courbetian reference was apt. Riffing on the idea that too many men throughout history have spent way too much time obsessing over female genitalia but not seeing the women it’s appended to, the comic is a bracing look, as one commenter put it, at just how far we haven’t come. Another rightly called it a public health manual.

De Robertis’s performance comes within days of the French parliament approving the creation of an enquiry into sexual violence within the arts. It comes less than a month of arguably the most famous #MeToo conviction being overturned. If the question, “Would you rather find yourself alone in the woods with a bear or a man?” has been trending on social media, it’s because sometimes you need to ask bonkers questions – or do bonkers actions – to get a point across. As gender violence expert Lisa Sugiura has put it: “This continuum of misogyny is women’s everyday reality – and at no point do bears feature.”

Sunday, May 12, 2024

Gaza, Gaza, Gaza - Reflexivity's "Current Thing"


One can always rely on the US to miss an opportunity to deploy its remaining imperial power for a good cause. Photo via Project Syndicate

Slavoj Žižek, "Protests of Despair"
These are crazy times. Biblical disturbances in nature, such as the repeated torrential rain in Dubai or the mass fish die-off in Vietnam’s overheated reservoir, seem to mirror our overheated politics and social environment.

At such moments, it is crucial to keep a cool head and analyze all the weird phenomena as closely, objectively, and dispassionately as possible. And few phenomena nowadays are weirder than the protests surrounding Israel’s bombardment and invasion of Gaza in response to Hamas’s terrorist attack last October.

We should acknowledge the rhetoric from some politicized Muslims, such as those who recently demonstrated in Hamburg, Germany, chanting “Kalifat ist die Lösung” (“Caliphate is the solution”). And we should concede that, despite the massive presence of Jews among the protesters, there are at least a few true anti-Semites among them (just as there are some genocidal maniacs in Israel).

While many commentators have noted the parallel between today’s pro-Palestinian demonstrations and the 1968 student protests against the Vietnam War, the Italian philosopher Franco Berardi points to an important difference. Rhetorically, at least, the 1968 protesters explicitly identified with the anti-imperialist Viet Cong position and a broader, positive socialist project, whereas today’s protesters very rarely identify with Hamas, and instead are “identifying with despair.”

As Berardi puts it: “Despair is the psychological and also cultural trait that explains the wide identification of young people with the Palestinians. I think that the majority of the students today are consciously or unconsciously expecting the irreversible worsening of the conditions of life, irreversible climate change, a long-lasting period of war, and the looming danger of a nuclear precipitation of the conflicts that are underway in many points of the geopolitical map.”

It would be difficult to explain the situation any better than that. The authorities’ obscenely repressive response to the protests supports Berardi’s hypothesis. The harsh crackdowns are not motivated by any fear that the protests will launch a new political movement; rather, they are expressions of panic – a futile refusal to confront the despair that pervades our societies.

Signs of this panic are everywhere, so allow me to offer just two examples. First, late last month, 12 US senators sent a letter to the International Criminal Court threatening it with sanctions should it decide to issue an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.

Although this was strictly a Republican undertaking, President Joe Biden’s administration also has pressured the ICC not to charge Israeli officials over war crimes committed in Gaza. Such threats signal nothing less than the demise of shared global values. Though this ideal was always somewhat hypocritical (the United States, for example, has refused to join the ICC), governments at least upheld it in spirit.

The second recent example supports the same conclusion. On May 4, France (complying with a German-issued visa ban) denied entry to Ghassan Abu-Sitta, a British-Palestinian surgeon who was scheduled to provide testimony to the French Senate on what he had witnessed while treating victims of the war in Gaza. With such crude acts of censorship and marginalization happening before our eyes, it is no longer an exaggeration to say that our democracies are crumbling.

Everyone knows that the situation in Gaza is unacceptable. But a great deal of energy has been devoted to postponing the kind of intervention that the crisis requires.

One way to help break the impasse is to offer public support for the student protests. As US Senator Bernie Sanders put it on April 28, “What Netanyahu’s right-wing, extremist, and racist government is doing is unprecedented in the modern history of warfare … Right now, we are looking at the possibility of mass starvation and famine in Gaza. When you make those charges, that is not anti-Semitic. That is a reality.”

After the October 7 attacks, Israel emphasized the raw realities of what Hamas had done. Let the images speak for themselves, Israeli authorities said. The brutal killings and rapes had been recorded by the perpetrators and were there for everyone to see. There was no need for complex contextualization.

Can we not now say the same about the Palestinian suffering in Gaza? Let the images speak for themselves. See the starving people in packed improvised tents, the children slowly dying as Israeli missile and drone strikes continue to reduce buildings to ruins, then to rubble, and then to dust.

I am reminded of what Michael Ignatieff (then a journalist) wrote in 2003 about the US invasion of Iraq: “For me, the key issue is what would be the best result for the Iraqi people – what is most likely to improve the human rights of 26 million Iraqis? What always drove me crazy about the opposition [to war] was that it was never about Iraq. It was a referendum on American power.”

The same point does not apply to today’s anti-war protests. Far from a referendum on Palestinian, Israeli, or American power, they are driven primarily by a desperate plea simply to stop the killing of Palestinians in Gaza.

So, what should the Biden administration do (aside from replacing Vice President Kamala Harris with Taylor Swift on this year’s ticket)? For starters, the US can join the global initiative to recognize Palestine as a state. Far from being an obstacle to peace in the Middle East, Palestinian statehood is a precondition for any serious negotiations between the two sides. By contrast, rejecting (or endlessly postponing) such recognition will inevitably support the fatalistic conclusion that war is the only option.

Strange as it may sound, we are witnessing one of the downsides of America’s loss of hegemonic power (as was also the case with the US withdrawal from northern Syria and then Afghanistan). Ideally, the US would simply invade Gaza from the sea, re-establish peace and order, and provide the population with humanitarian assistance. But don’t count on it. One can always rely on the US to miss an opportunity to deploy its remaining imperial power for a good cause.

If You're a Quantum Physicist...

...EVERYTHING is Quantum!

If ONLY consciousness had a means of Physically re-integrating Brain Waves... cepi corpus through Microtubules.

Slavoj Again...

Slavoj Zizek, "My Britney Spears Theory of Action"
Every week I check the weather in Longyearbyen, the main settlement in Svalbard. It’s about as close as you can get to a gulag with a human face – a heap of wooden houses where around 2,000 people live. It has a couple of stores and restaurants, and even a very small university. Outside the two streets, there’s much open space in which to walk. You don’t have to go far before being greeted with warning signs: ‘Don’t walk beyond this line without a gun! Danger of polar bears!’ At the door to all the cafés there is another sign: ‘Please leave your guns at the entrance!’ How can you not love a settlement like this? I can imagine living here. My life would be simultaneously a holiday and hard work – as I always imagined communism.

That said, I don’t hate Ljubljana, where I reside. My memories of a youth under communism are much better. In the early 1970s, we got the last Indian summer of more hard-line communism, so that, after finishing my studies, I wasn’t able to get a job. Even this proved to be a blessing in disguise. After a couple of years of unemployment, I got a post at a small research institute which gave me time to travel around, study abroad and establish professional links. The supreme irony is that, without the ‘Stalinist oppression’ of the mid-1970s, I would have been given a post at the university. I’d now be a little-known professor in Ljubljana, losing time with noisy and inquisitive students.

Britney Spears has reached a settlement with her estranged father more than two years after the court-ordered termination of a conservatorship that had given him control of her life. I wasn’t in the least surprised to learn that, when she finally achieved the long-desired freedom, her personal life went into freefall. To explain, one has to go back to an interview she gave to MTV in 2003 when she was asked about the second Gulf War. ‘I don’t quite understand it,’ she said. ‘All I know is that, at a certain point, we ordinary people should simply trust our president in every decision he makes and should just support that, and be faithful in what happens.’ Obviously, she applied the same rule in her dealings with her father, trusting him in every decision she made. She’s paying the price for it.

At the time I coined this the ‘Britney Spears Theory of Action’. The lesson to be drawn from her mishap is that, in our political life, the era in which we could trust those in power is over. If we don’t regain a truly critical attitude, not just a cynical distance towards those in power, we all may end up like Spears did. Does anyone really think we can trust our leaders today in every decision they make?

With some delay, I saw the Japanese-German film Perfect Days. Koji Yakusho plays Hirayama, a toilet cleaner in Tokyo, who is content with his simple life. From dawn, he follows a ritualised daily rhythm. His free time is dedicated to his passion for music, listening to records in his van to and from work, and reading books every night before bed. He would be an ideal listener of Taylor Swift. Her music ideally fits today’s predominant mode of subjectivity: it avoids both extremes of neoconservative populism and of left-liberal politically correct stiffness, focusing instead on the apolitical sphere of broken love affairs and similar daily traumas or small pleasures. This is why her anti-Trump stance provokes fury and even conspiracy theories. The US elections will be won by the party who attracts the majority of the apolitical youth.

We have been bombarded by news about how criminal gangs have taken over the public space in Haiti. This decay of public power is not limited to third-world countries like Haiti. Western focus should be on Israel as a first-world failed state. Away from Gaza, Israelis continue to menace Palestinians in the West Bank. They are doing this while the Israeli army and police stand idly by. Is this not another case of illegal gangs openly violating the law?

Recently, I have been obsessively listening to podcasts about Tristan da Cunha, the 98 sq km island in the middle of nowhere in the South Atlantic. On 10 October 1961, a volcanic eruption forced the evacuation of all 264 people to the UK. In 1963 almost all of them returned, withstanding the temptation of developed capitalism. The island has a unique social and economic structure based on solidarity, not competition. All the resident families farm and all land is communally owned… in short, it is a communist island. So much more than Bhutan with its ridiculous ‘dictatorship of happiness’, Tristan da Cunha should serve as a model for all of us.

Tuesday, May 7, 2024

Ideological Cures for Hysteria

Slavoj Žižek, "Fear of God = Transmission Joy" (Google translated from Turkish)
Dear Abner, I fear God and no one else.

The effect of this word transforms Abner. While he is an impatient, zealous, anxious and indecisive person, when he hears these words, he finds peace in his faith, and at that moment he trusts both himself and the power of the Almighty God. How does the 'fear of God' talk achieve this miraculous 'conversion to religion'?

Before his transformation, according to Abner, worldly life was full of dangers that made him tremble with fear, and he was waiting for God and his representatives, whom he considered to be on his side, to lend a helping hand and enable him to overcome the difficulties in the world.

When the worrying uncertainty of the realm of earthly dangers is pitted against the reassuringly peaceful love of the realm of theology, Joad is not content with trying to convince Abner that the divine forces are strong enough to overcome earthly turmoil.

He allays Abner's fears in a very different way: He presents God, the opposite of the world, as a being more frightening than all earthly dangers. And – this is the 'miracle' of the seam – this 'one more fear', this fear of God, retroactively changes the character of all other fears.

Notes:

From the Supreme Hysteric

Turkish: Işık Barış Fidaner
Slavoj Žižek, ‘Variations of the mØther—The Two Sides of Perversion’

Slavoj Žižek, ‘Modalities of the Absolute’

Monday, May 6, 2024

Linguistics and Intelligence

The Cognitive Tradeoff Hypothesis:
Long Term vs Working Memory?  Bytes vs. Bits

from Wikipedia
The cognitive tradeoff hypothesis argues that in the cognitive evolution of humans, there was an evolutionary tradeoff between short-term working memory and complex language skills. Specifically, early hominids sacrificed the robust working memory seen in chimpanzees for more complex representations and hierarchical organization used in language. The theory was first brought forth by Japanese primatologist Tetsuro Matsuzawa, a former director of the Primate Research Institute of Kyoto University (KUPRI).

Matsuzawa suggests that at a certain point in evolution, because of limitations in brain capacity, the human brain may have acquired new functions in parallel with losing others – such as acquiring language while losing visuospatial temporal storage ability.

Prophets from the Edge of the Inside - Stephen Kotkin

Stephen Kotkin, "The Five Futures of Russia"
To Survive, Kyiv Must Build New Brigades—and Force Moscow to Negotiate

After months of delay, Congress’s passage of a nearly $61 billion U.S. aid bill to Ukraine has provided a vital lifeline to Kyiv. But the aid package alone will not solve Ukraine’s larger problems in its war with Russia. Ukrainian forces are defending frontlines that span some 600 miles of the south and east of the country, and prolonged inaction in Washington has left them severely stretched. The influx of U.S. weapons and ammunition should significantly raise the cost to Russia of its impending summer offensive. The aid also offers Ukrainian forces enough materiel to support more systematic military planning for the summer and fall.

Yet ending the war on terms favorable to Ukraine will require far more than a new pipeline of equipment. More than two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its objective in the war remains unchanged: the Kremlin seeks to subjugate Kyiv. Inconstant support and political delays among Ukraine’s international partners have left that outcome all too plausible. If Ukraine is to prevent Russian victory in the longer term, it will need a comprehensive strategy. This means training, equipping, and mobilizing new forces. It means convincing the Kremlin that continuing the war will become increasingly risky to Russia over time. And it means establishing a position of sufficient strength to be able to set forth, on Ukraine’s own terms, the parameters of a lasting peace.

None of these tasks will be straightforward, and none can happen overnight. Nor can Ukraine and its international partners afford to fritter away months formulating a way forward. The United States and its NATO allies will need to make explicit long-term commitments; compelling Russia to negotiate will be especially difficult. But the alternatives are far worse. In the absence of such an overall strategy, the duration of the conflict may be extended, but its trajectory will not.

GRIMACING AT GLIDE BOMBS

Since the fall of 2023, Ukraine’s battlefield situation has steadily worsened. Largely because of ammunition shortages, Ukrainian forces have had to cede territory to Russian forces, often after sustaining significant casualties. Russia has amassed approximately 470,000 troops in Ukraine and seems intent on using them to try to complete the conquest of Donbas over the remainder of 2024. Russian forces have been focusing their attacks on key eastern towns that, once taken, will allow them to threaten Ukraine’s main logistics hubs in and around the Donetsk region.

Talk of a new Russian offensive may conjure up images of tank units assaulting Ukrainian lines, breaking through, and then trying to exploit those gains deep into Ukrainian-held territory in order to cut off Ukrainian units. But Russia’s forces are not currently able to carry out these kinds of operations, nor do they intend to. After more than two years of war, Russia’s army has suffered heavy losses among its officer core, and its ability to plan and synchronize large-scale attacks is limited. Russian attacks mainly consist of successive assaults at platoon and company scale, resulting in slow advances with heavy losses.

Still, Russia currently enjoys a more than ten-to-one advantage over Ukraine in available artillery. With the passage of the new U.S. aid package, that advantage will likely shrink to three to one in some regions, which will increase the rate of Russian casualties. But Russia has several ways of pulling Ukrainian forces into fights that are also costly to Ukraine. For example, Russian forces have been using converted glide bombs to devastating effect. These are Soviet-designed FAB-500s—large half-ton bombs—that have been outfitted with wings and guidance kits and that are lobbed by Russian aircraft from behind the Russian lines. With an approximately 40-mile range, they can easily strike Ukrainian towns, collapsing buildings and driving out local populations.

As a result, Ukrainian forces have often been forced to expend significant resources defending costly single positions, simply to shield civilian settlements from coming into Russian glide-bomb range. Take Chasiv Yar, a small town on a key ridge line in the eastern Donetsk region. If it falls, Russian forces will gain a commanding position from which to bombard towns in Donbas and key Ukrainian supply routes. Thus, Ukrainian forces are desperately trying to hold on to it, even as the tactical situation becomes less favorable. The challenge has been amplified by Ukraine’s overstretched air defenses, a situation that now permits Russian planes to come close to the frontlines, increasing the accuracy of their bombing. Unfortunately, the more Ukraine needs its surface-to-air missile systems to protect its cities, the greater it puts at risk its ground forces at the front.

The solution to this challenge would usually be what military strategists call an “active defense,” using small-scale counterattacks to disrupt the attacker’s efforts to consolidate its advances. If, say, Russian forces seized a key position in Chasiv Yar, the Ukrainians could use counterattacks to isolate the position so that the Russians were unable to dig in and keep moving forward. But Ukraine has few reserves and has lost many of the tactical vehicles needed to exploit Russian vulnerabilities soon after they take positions. Lacking the reserves to counterattack, Ukraine must settle for maximizing Russia’s losses for each position it takes, thereby slowing down its rate of advance.

Under these conditions, even the passage of the U.S. aid bill can do only so much to change the battlefield calculus. The long delay in Washington means that it will take time to repair much of the damage to Ukrainian capabilities. Ukraine will lose ground to Russia this summer. The question is how much, and how high a price Ukrainian forces can make the Russians pay for their gains.

FRESH BLOOD, NOT MORE BLOOD

Other than the immediate provision of ammunition, the greatest effect of the new U.S. aid package is the certainty it offers. After months in which the timing and amount of U.S. support was in doubt, Ukraine will now have enough clarity about military resources for the next six months to allow for broader strategic planning.

Paramount is the need to generate new forces. To do so, Ukraine will need to mobilize more people, improve its training pipeline to maintain a qualitative advantage over Russian units, and adequately equip those new troops. Until now this has been impossible. Lacking equipment and weapons, and unable to predict if and when more might arrive, Ukraine’s military leadership was forced to prioritize all materiel for troops already at the front. The size of the U.S. aid package—and the further support of European partners—means that Ukraine’s military leadership can now implement a deliberate plan to train and equip more troops. Contrary to widespread assumptions, Ukraine does not lack people to mobilize. (According to one recent analysis, there could be several million additional Ukrainians who are able to serve.) What it has lacked is an effective recruitment and training system to bring available people into the force and equipment to provision them. These problems can and must be resolved.

Ukrainian commanders must form new brigades rather than simply bringing their existing formations back up to strength. The army currently lacks enough brigades to rotate them as a whole off the frontline. Instead, individual brigades have been rotating exhausted battalions just off the line of contact for brief respites—a strategy that provides rest but does not allow for collective training of the brigade, since brigade staff and enabling equipment remain at the front. Thus, it is crucial for Ukraine to build and train additional brigades now, so that it can mount an active defense in the fall. Over time, these new units will greatly enhance its ability to counterattack.

The military must therefore pursue mobilization in three stages. First, it must immediately raise battlefield replacements for the existing force. But then it must regenerate reserves to allow existing units to rotate and, after that, build new units able to conduct offensive action. The first is the easiest to solve. Equipment is the limiting factor for the second. For the third, the most limiting factor is officer training. This can be addressed, but it must be done imminently if Ukraine is to generate the needed forces by fall.

Russia will likely be most dangerous in the final months of 2024. By that point, having weathered months of Russian offensive operations, Ukrainian forces will be stretched thin, their air defenses depleted. Russia will likely have enough troops to rotate its units to allow for successive offensives in the fall.

But Russian capabilities are not unlimited. Moscow has made some industrial and military choices that are likely to restrict its offensive potential over the course of 2025. For one, it has decided not to expand production of artillery barrels, with the result that fewer new guns will be available next year. Based on the current loss rate, Russian stockpiles of armored vehicles will also likely be depleted by the second half of 2025. This means that Russian forces will be entirely dependent on newly produced equipment rather than refurbished equipment from existing stock, severely constraining their ability to replenish weapons systems lost in battle. At the same time, beginning in late 2024, European armaments production will begin to climb steadily as investments made last year and in the first months of this year begin to bear fruit. By 2025, then, supply problems should be less acute for Ukraine and more acute for Russia—if Ukraine can hold on until then.

With this longer-term perspective in view, the challenge facing Ukraine and its allies becomes clear. The top priorities must be to ensure not only that Russia’s summer offensive culminates at a high cost to Moscow but also that newly raised Ukrainian troops are in place to blunt further offensives in the autumn—and, ideally, to establish a stable frontline by early 2025. It is only from such a position that Ukraine can regain the initiative. Achieving that objective will depend to a significant degree on how rapidly Ukraine can mobilize and equip its forces. The one commodity it desperately lacks is time.

BRINGING MOSCOW TO THE TABLE

Even if Ukraine is able to blunt Russian gains by rapidly training, equipping, and deploying new forces, these steps will not in themselves produce a pathway to ending the conflict. Ultimately, this is because Kyiv’s international partners have built their case for support on the simpler objective of preserving Ukraine in the fight rather than on compelling Russia to negotiate on favorable terms.

The United States and its European allies need to recognize that helping Ukraine negate Russian attacks is not the same as putting Ukraine in a strong negotiating position. The Kremlin is keen for negotiations based on the war’s current dynamics: it believes that once talks are underway, Ukraine’s Western backers will agree to nearly anything, seeing any settlement that can be reached as successful, even if it fails to protect Ukraine in the long term. And Russia’s demand would remain what it has been throughout: a surrender in all but name. For Moscow to truly negotiate, it must be confronted with a situation in which extending the conflict further will present an unacceptable threat to itself. It is only then that Ukraine will be able to extract meaningful concessions.

Russia already faces several pressure points. First, Russia’s battlefield losses of critical systems—such as air defenses—matter, because they form the bulwark of Russia’s conventional deterrence of NATO. Equipping Ukraine to be able to damage or destroy prestige Russian assets is strongly in NATO’s interest. Second, Russia will be unable to fund the war indefinitely. Western sanctions are only one of the tools for damaging the regime’s financial liquidity, and they are less effective than other options. Damage to Russia’s oil infrastructure is likely to have a much greater impact. Although there are good reasons for the West to avoid directly aiding such attacks, that does not mean that Ukraine shouldn’t undertake them.

Third, although the Russian public largely supports the war, there are deep frustrations with the Russian government that can be exploited. So far, Western governments have not aggressively pursued information operations against the Russian government, partly because they are perceived as escalatory and partly because they are not expected to have immediate effect. By contrast, Russia has been conducting active information operations across Europe with the intent of destabilizing the West.

This asymmetry needs to be remedied. Western concerns that information warfare could provoke escalation are unconvincing: the Kremlin is as determined as the White House to avoid a direct confrontation over Ukraine. Moreover, the Kremlin has long assumed that the West has pursued extensive information operations against it since 2011, even though this is not the case. Any potential escalation risk of such operations is therefore already baked in. Moreover, most of the Kremlin’s routes to escalation do not actually involve countering such activities. Given this situation, there is much more that the West can do. Over the longer term, more and better information operations could heighten Moscow’s awareness of the domestic risks that its costly war has stirred up.

THE FIREPOWER FIX
Given the extent to which it is currently outgunned, Ukraine doesn’t yet have the ability to set forth favorable negotiating terms to end the war. A cease-fire would likely see Russia reconstitute its military power, while Ukraine would not be able to maintain its own forces at their current size. Moreover, Kyiv would likely receive waning support for reconstruction if renewed Russian hostilities were anticipated in the near future. Rebuilding Ukraine will depend critically on investment from the private sector, and the threat of a new conflict will make any such financing risky. To ensure that Ukraine can negotiate in the confidence that it can secure a lasting peace, Kyiv’s international partners will have to offer security guarantees that it trusts. Because Ukraine cannot propose those guarantees, it will be up to its international partners to make the first move.

Ultimately, any successful end to the war will depend on NATO’s ability to convincingly deter Russia. That posture requires the alliance not only to field sufficient forces to counter a threat from Russia but also to establish sufficient production capacity among its members to sustain a steady flow of munitions in the event of another war. Establishing this supply will be necessary regardless of how the war ends. In the short term, expanded production of munitions will be essential to Ukraine’s ability to degrade the Russian military. If Ukraine manages to protract the conflict and the war is terminated in its favor, its partners will need munitions to bolster the credibility of their security guarantees. If, on the other hand, Russia achieves its objectives, then these munitions will be needed to underwrite the future security of NATO.

The U.S. military aid package was passed just in time to stave off a Ukrainian collapse. But to truly shift the direction of the war, it will need to be accompanied by a far more comprehensive strategy to successfully end it. And that must come from Washington, its NATO allies, and Kyiv itself.

Saturday, May 4, 2024

Dopamine and Surplus Jouissance

A rough way of defining surplus jouissance would be to think of it, on analogy with Marx’s surplus value, as jouissance that is lost to the subject and recuperated by the Other.
- Justin Clemens and Russell Grigg, "Introduction to: Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis"

 

object a is constitutive of the parlêtre in two respects. It is constitutive of him as what he is missing (Lacan, 2001b , p. 573) – that is, as the object “that is no longer there.” But it is also the pathway or rail by which the “ plus-de-jouirs ” come to desire. (...) In other words, object a is what is missing and what all the objects that are not missing from reality seek to make us forget. In everyday discourse – in which the master signifier, S1 , organizes both psychical and everyday reality – the subject is a complete subject who does not conceptualize his lack, for the plus-de-jouirs that are proposedcombined with the more intimate plus-de-jouirs found in fantasy – act so as to fill in the gap. Without this filling-in activity, we would be hard-pressed to understand why the universal nature of castration could have been so thoroughly misrecognized prior to Freud’s time; nor would we be able to understand how certain contemporary authors, who are no dumber than others, can ridicule Lacan’s reference to lack and believe that they are truly in sync with our times when they claim, on the contrary, that we are now in what a certain film has called “the land of plenty.” 
Colette Soler," Lacanian Affects"

 

the very ambiguity of Lacan’s concept plus-de-jouir: it can be read as surplus enjoyment, but at the same time it can also mean no more enjoyment; it has the contours of an imperative, something like “Stop enjoying!” or “Cut it off!” So the very same gesture that prohibits, inhibits, and stops enjoyment produces a surplus, something one gets in place of the cut-off enjoyment. All ascetic practices testify to this, most notably those described by Hegel in The Phenomenology of Spirit under the heading of the unhappy consciousness, which is consciousness that is ultimately prepared to give up all its worldly possessions and corporeal enjoyment, all its autonomy, and treat itself like a thing. However, the more the subject does this, the more there emerges a residue, a bit of the substance that cannot be quite turned into the subject, and which is precisely the bit of enjoyment, the surplus enjoyment that has unexpectedly emerged in the operation—and the subject, the subject of self-consciousness, emerges precisely as correlative to that bit.  
Mladen Dolar, "Hegel as the Other Side of Psychoanalysis"

 

the loss of the object, the loss of satisfaction, and the emergence of a surplus satisfaction or surplus enjoyment are situated, topologically speaking, in one and the same point: in the intervention of the signifier (...)According to Freud, in the event of the loss of the object the investment is transferred to the unary trait that marks this loss; the identification with a unary trait thus occupies the (structural) place of the lost object. Yet, at the same time, this identification (and with it the repeating and reenacting of that trait) becomes itself the source of a supplementary satisfaction(...) He links the Freudian unary trait to what he writes as S1. Furthermore, he delinearizes and condenses the moments of loss and supplementary satisfaction or enjoyment into one single moment, moving away from the notion of an original loss (of an object), to a notion of loss which is closer to the notion of waste, of a useless surplus or remainder, which is inherent in and essential to jouissance as such... So, jouissance is waste (or loss); it incarnates the very entropy produced by the working of the apparatus of the signifiers. However, precisely as waste, this loss is not simply a lack, an absence, something missing. It is very much there (as waste always is), something to be added to the signifying operations and equations, and to be reckoned with as such. 
Alenka Zupančič, "When Surplus Enjoyment Meets Surplus Value"

In this Seminar, the emphasis is placed both on the signifier as a mark of jouissance - he can say that the master-signifier commemorates an irruption of jouissance - and, at the same time, it introduces a loss of jouissance and produces a supplement of jouissance. By an analogy that makes him borrow the term entropy from thermodynamics, he says: Entropy makes the plus-de-jouir to be recovered take shape. And, elsewhere in the Seminar:The plus-de-jouir takes shape from a loss. From then on, access to jouissance is not essentially through transgression, but through entropy, through the loss produced by the signifier This is how Lacan can say that knowledge is a means to jouissance (...) The autonomy of the symbolic order could not be better renounced. It is a means of jouissance in a double sense, insofar as it has the effect of lack and produces the supplement, the plus-de-jouir. 
Jacques-Alain Miller," Six Paradigmes de Jouissance" (Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator)
Start @ 4:18 for a great surplus Jouissance example (a baby with a pacifier)
“The trouble with jouissance is not that it is unattainable, that it always eludes our grasp, but, rather, that one can never get rid of it, that its stain drags along for ever.Therein resides the point of Lacan’s concept of surplus-enjoyment: the very renunciation of jouissance brings about a remainder, a surplus of jouissance.”
- Slavoj Žižek," The Indivisible Remainder"

Friday, May 3, 2024

Thee:Thou::The:Other

"Every effort to turn Ethics into a principle of thought and action is essentially religious... Ethics is a category of pious discourse.... We are left with a Pious discourse without piety. A spiritual supplement for incompetent governments, and a cultural sociology preached in line with the new style sermons in lieu of the late class struggle.... become like me, and I will respect your difference!"
- Emmanuel Levinas
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Alain Badiou, "Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil"

Excerpts:
Ethics according to Levinas

Roughly speaking, Levinas maintains that metaphysics imprisoned by its Greek Origins has subordinated thought to the logic of the same, to the Primacy of substance and identity. But according to Levinas, it is impossible to arrive at an authentic thought of the other, and thus an ethics of the relation to the other from the despotism of the same, which is incapable of recognizing this other. The dialectic of the same and the other conceived ontologically, under the dominance of self identity, identitais, ensures the absence of the other in effective thought, suppresses all genuine experience of the other, and bars the way to an ethical opening to alterity.

So, we must push thought over to a different origin, a non-Greek origin. One that proposes a radical primary opening to the other, conceived as ontologically anterior to the construction of identity. It is in the Jewish tradition that Levinas finds the basis for this pushing over. What the law understood according to Jewish tradition as both immemorial and currently in effect names, is precisely the anteriority founded in being before the same, and with respect to theoretical thought of the ethics of the relation to the other, itself conceived merely as the objective identification of regularities and identities. This law, indeed, does not tell me what is, but what is imposed by the existence of others.  This "law of the other" might be opposed to the laws of the real.
 
According to Greek thought, adequate action presumes an initial theoretical Mastery of experience which ensures that the action is in Conformity with the rationality of being. From this point of departure are deduced laws in the plural, of the city, and of action. According to Jewish ethics in Levinas' sense, everything is grounded in the immediacy of an opening to the other which disarms the reflexive subject. The thou, who prevails over the I. Such is the whole meaning of The Law.

Levinas proposes a whole series of phenomenological themes for testing and exploring the originality of the other, at the center of which lies the theme of The Face, of the singular, giving, denoncion, of the other in person, through his fleshly Epiphany, which does not test domestic recognition: the other as similar, identical to me, but on the contrary is that from which I experience myself, ethically, as pledged to the appearing of the other and subordinated in my being to this pledge. For Levinas, ethics is the new name of thought, thought which has thrown off its logical chains, the principle of identity, in favor of its' prophetic submission to the law of founding alterity.

The ethics of difference

Whether they know it or not, it is in the name of this configuration that the proponents of Ethics explain to us today that it amounts to recognition of the other, Against Racism which would deny this other, or to the ethics of differences against substantialist nationalism, which would exclude immigrants, or sexism which would deny feminine being, or to multiculturalism against the imposition of a unified model of behavior and intellectual approach, or quite simply to good old fashioned tolerance, which consists of not being offended by the fact that others think and act differently from you.

This common sensical discourse has neither Force nor truth. It is defeated in advance in the competition it declares between tolerance and fanaticism, between the ethics of difference and racism, between recognition of the other and identitarian fixity. For the honor of philosophy, it is first of all necessary to admit that this ideology of a right to difference, the Contemporary catechism of goodwill with regard to other cultures, are strikingly distant from Levinas his actual conception of things.
Excerpts from video:
What (in the Jewish tradition) is the meaning of the prohibition of making an image? Here, Levinas introduces a great innovation. The prohibition of the image is actually the prohibition of representation, it's prohibition on capturing a person as a meaning inside a specific box we call his body, appearance, profession, his trade... It's about going beyond, opening up beyond this. The transition, so typical of Jewish culture, from the image to the spoken word, it's a transition from what I can grasp to what's really there. And what is there - no definition, description or image can fully capture. It is to deal with infinity, dealing with man - dealing with infinity. It's the religious meaning of relations between one person and another. So the prohibition of the image is not minor, or one of the Torah's prohibitions, it gives special expression to the struggle between the visible and that which is beyond the visible. Ethics is always on this side. The visible encloses, it frames; ethics frees us from the visible, introducing into the visible the metaphysical, infinite dimension.
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Youssef Seddik:

The foundation in Judaism is an obligation for us Muslims. Philosophically, the most important issue is the prohibition of the image. And even Muslim sages ignored this throughout their whole life. The Quran repeats the ten commandments, and "though shalt not an image", which is essential in Judaism, is replaced by the Quran by: "If you construct an argument - be honest". The image is integrated in the discussion. The discussion must be honest, including the plasticity of the image. This should be considered as Levinasean. It's not only the perceptible aspect of the image, but any simulacra as such, including lying and injustice. Even concepts can become idolatry. There's a saying of the prophet which I'm not sure is true, because I don't believe in the Hadith, that sums up the words of the prophet, the prophet says: Any idol is prohibited, including the Quran itself. Even concepts must not be turned in to idols.
Do I Exist?  Do I Need to be Seen Being Seen (Facebook)?  Establish my "profile"?
Do I need to SEE my own face in order to real-ize a visual sense my OWN "infinitude"?  Remove all doubts?  As in some kind of hyper-real "Mirror Stage"

Thursday, May 2, 2024

Philosophy for Quants

Slavoj Zizek, "Some Remarks on the Ontological Implications of Quantum Physics"
Why am I, as a Hegelian philosopher, so fascinated by quantum mechanics? What we find in quantum physics is something that is usually considered an exclusive feature of the symbolic universe, namely a self-reflective move of including one’s (the observer’s) own subjective position into the series of observed phenomena. Recall Hegel’s famous infinite judgment “Spirit is a bone.” How does it work? Instead of arguing (from the safe distance of an observer) that spirit cannot be reduced to a bone, it begins by endorsing the claim “spirit is a bone,” the reaction to which (of us, observers) is shock: we experience this claim is blatant nonsense, as radical self-related negativity… but it is only through experiencing the nonsense/negativity of this statement that we arrive at Spirit because “spirit” is such a self-relating negativity which encompasses me in my subjective stance.

What has this to so with quantum mechanics? Let’s dive directly in medias res. The fact that a particle – say, an electron – takes all possible paths when it travels from point A to point B means that this particle splits and interacts with itself, not just with other surrounding particles. One should not miss the Hegelian “speculative” echo of this formulation: what appears as the interaction of elements external to each other turns out to be the interaction of one element with itself. The ultimate consequence of this approach was brought out by Richard Feynman in his classical paper from 1949 where he introduced his notion of positron as being actually an electron running backward in time. The trade-off enacted by Feynman is: if we accept running backward in time, the whole image gets simplified, one element suffices.
“In the approximation of classical relativistic theory the creation of an electron pair (electron A, positron B) might be represented by the start of two world lines from the point of creation, 1. The world lines of the positron will then continue until it annihilates another electron, C, at a world point 2. Between the times t1 and t2 there are then three world lines, before and after only one. However, the world lines of C, B, and A together form one continuous line albeit the “positron part” B of this continuous line is directed backwards in time. Following the charge rather than the particles corresponds to considering this continuous world line as a whole rather than breaking it up into its pieces. It is as though a bombardier flying low over a road suddenly sees three roads and it is only when two of them come together and disappear again that he realizes that he has simply passed over a long switchback in a single road.”
I am, of course, not qualified to judge the scientific validity of this line of thought; all I am saying is that, from my Hegelian standpoint, it works perfectly. What I especially appreciate in it is that what appeared to be another positive element of reality (positron) is grasped as something which differs from its opposite only because of its different temporal line. And, to risk a jump to another domain altogether, is this not also a proper way to reject the dualism of good and evil? The good God himself “turns back in time,” becomes evil (the Old Testament god of wrath and fury) and then turns to goodness (to love) only when it is born in/as a man in Christ.

How should reality be structured so that such paradoxes become possible? To explain the present state of a physical system, the usual scientific approach needs two elements: the original situation (boundary conditions) and the laws that determine the evolution of the original situation into its present state. Relying on Wheeler and others, Hertog[1] adds a third element, observership (an observer who is not just a passive witness but focuses attention on some parts of the observed state by way of asking questions and in this way regulates, directs even, the evolution of a system, even when we are dealing with the past evolution): “The triptych evokes the idea that this grand question /of the origins of the universe/ retroactively draws into existence those few branches of cosmological history that have properties that are being observed. Observership in quantum cosmology /…/ is an indispensable part of the continual process through which physical reality – and physical theory, we argue – come about.” (188-9)

Quantum cosmology thus involves
“a subtle backward-in-time element. One doesn’t follow the universe from the bottom up – forward in time – because one no longer presumes the universe has an objective observer-independent history, with a definite starting point and evolution. Quite the contrary, built into the triptych is the counterintuitive idea that in some fundamental sense /…/ history at the very deepest level emerges backward in time. It is as if a constant flux of quantum acts of observation retroactively carves out the outcome of the big bang, from the number of dimensions that grow large to the types of forces and particles that arise.” (189)
The first thing to add here is that the temporality in quantum processes is double: the backward movement (a recent “collapse” retroactively changes/reconstructs the past) has to be supplemented with a no less paradoxical forward movement in time. John Wheeler, the “archetypal physics-for-poets physicist,” complicated things further and imagined a delayed-choice experiment: the experimenter decides whether to leave both slits open or to close one off after the electron has already passed through the barrier—with the same results. The electrons seem to know in advance how the physicist will choose to observe it. (This experiment was carried out in the early 1990s and confirmed Wheeler’s prediction.)

If we read the history of the cosmos bottom-up, then the enigma of the improbability of intelligent life on Earth remains unresolved: how was it possible that our cosmos (which existed billions of years before life on Earth emerged) is composed in such an extremely improbable way that life on Earth is possible? The answer that imposes itself is, of course, God and teleology: some higher force had to direct the evolution of the cosmos in the direction of the possibility of intelligent life… But in the top-down approach the probability distribution “is of no significance because ‘we’ have already measured that we live in a universe with three large dimensions of space.”(199) Or, as Lacan would have put it, a letter always arrives at its destination not because of some hidden teleology guaranteeing this outcome but because “destination” is retroactive: the destination of a letter is contingent, but the point at which a letter contingently arrives IS its destination.

But Hertog makes here a step further which I find problematic: he says that biologists can also “use this knowledge /arrived at through backward-in-time reasoning/ to influence future branchings.” So, it is not only that “at the quantum level, the universe engineers its own biofriendliness”(255); it is also that “scientists are starting to envisage hypothetical laws and then engineer systems in which they emerge”(261), and this means we (humanity) are at the “dawn of a new era, the first of its kind in the history of Earth, and perhaps even of the cosmos, in which a species attempts to reconfigure and transcend the biosphere it has evolved in. Echoing Hannah Arendt, from merely undergoing evolution, we are transitioning toward engineering it and, with it, our humanities.” (263)

I think this idea misreads Arendt’s intention: when she emphasizes our (humanity’s) finitude and groundedness in Earth, Arendt speaks as a Heideggerian for whom the very idea of “engineering evolution and, with it, our humanness” is the danger we are confronting today: when we engineer nature, inclusive of our own nature, humanness is over because by definition it cannot be engineered. Rather, we are thrown into it, and Arendt’s Heideggerian point is that our relationship to reality as an object of engineering is rooted in a certain disclosure of the meaning of Being which stands for utter self-destructive nihilism, the idea that “the courage of our questions and the depth of our answers would allow us to navigate planet Earth safely and wisely into the future.” (266)

Furthermore, I find utterly problematic the vision of a smooth passage from spontaneous/unpredictable quantum collapses to having an overview of superpositions and then deciding for one among them that fits our interests:
“Taking a quantum view, the myriad of paths forking off into the future are in a sense already out there, as a landscape of possibilities. Some futures may even appear rather plausible. We should learn from the past, though, that chance constantly interferes, leading history to take unexpected twists and turns.” (264)
However, freedom is not unpredictable contingency but a “freely” imposed necessity, the act of decision which cannot be reduced to its causes, while a quantum collapse is by definition a point at which chance interferes. Furthermore, if our unsurpassable finitude means anything at all, it means precisely that we a priori cannot acquire “a clear global vision” of our predicament: to do this we would have, as it were, to step on our own shoulders and look at ourselves from outside. Top-down approach means that our evolution has already collapsed into our present state and we cannot see in advance which superpositions are contained as non-collapsed in our present state.

The notion of finitude could also be given a different spin. A simple but convincing idea circulated recently in some media: since there is a limited number of sounds that can be used to compose a song, and since millions of songs were already written, it is practically impossible today to avoid plagiarism – basically all possible songs were already written. Does the same hold also for philosophy? Are all basic philosophical stances already formulated? However, the paradox here is that the experience of the space of songs as potentially infinite is grounded in our very finitude – only if it were possible to step out of our finitude and grasp the space of possible songs from an external view, would we be able to see its finitude. Infinity is thus strictly a category rooted in our finitude – as in quantum mechanics in which the multiplicity of superpositions appears infinite precisely because we cannot step out of ourselves and grasp the totality of the universe “objectively.”

Here the notion of hologram enters: “The latest incarnation of holography envisions that everything in the four dimensions we experience is in fact a manifestation of a hidden reality located on a thin slice of spacetime.”(212) Plato’s vision is turned on its head: “everything there is to know about strings and gravity in a four-dimensional anti-de-Sutter universe can be encrypted in quantum interactions of ordinary particles and fields lying entirely in the three-dimensional boundary surface. The surface world would function as a kind of hologram /…/ It is almost as if you could learn everything about the interior of an orange by meticulously analyzing its skin.” (225) However, does the holographic cosmology not tend to reduce the parallax tension to the classic duality of the true basic reality of a hologram and the standard reality of our expanding universe?
“If, as holographic cosmology posits, the surface of our observations is in some sense all there is, then this builds in the backward-in-time operation that is the hallmark of top-down cosmology. Holography tells us that there is an entity more basic than time – a hologram – from which the past emerges. The evolving and expanding universe would be output, not input in a holographic universe.” (243)
How far can we go in this direction? John Wheeler is famous for proposing the phrase “the it from bit”: “every it – every particle, every field of force, even the spacetime continuum itself – derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely – even if in some contexts indirectly – from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, bits.” Is this formula not the ultimate scientific version of the fundamental ontological premise of Western metaphysics: whatever exists in reality (any “it”) results from some “bit,” from a cognitive logical matrix? If we follow this path, we end up in a new version of idealism, the timeless network of qubits out of which “it,” our reality, emerges, so that the ultimate reality “may be better thought of as a mathematical realm that can inform physics but need not exist as such” (247):
“quantum information inscribed in an abstract timeless hologram of entangled qubits forms the thread that weaves reality. /…/ It is as if there is a code, operating on countless entangled qubits, that brings about physical reality.” (244-5)
This basic reality of qubits is at the same time in the past and in our future, since we are not yet able (not just to discover but simultaneously) to create it: holography “places the true origin of the universe in the distant future, because only the far future would reveal the hologram in its full glory.” (245)

What remains here of the Darwinian insight that “not the laws as such but their capacity to change and transmute would have the final word” (246)? What remains of the idea of overcoming “the separation between law-like dynamics and ad hoc boundary conditions as a fundamental property of nature” (80)? Or, as Hawking put it, for the classic physical science,
“theoretical physics will have achieved its goal when we have obtained a set of local dynamic laws. They would regard the question of the boundary conditions of the universe as belonging to the realm of metaphysics or religion. But we shall not have a complete theory until we can do more than merely say that things are as they are because they were as they were.” (82)
The only alternative to this idealist vision (or, rather, its necessary supplement) is a self-limitation, i.e., the claim that “we are living in a patch of spacetime, surrounded by an ocean of uncertainty about which, well, we must remain silent.” (247) So there is a boundary to (our) cosmos, the boundary which does not reside in its outer limits but is implied by the very position in which we find ourselves as observers and from which, in a top-bottom approach, we reconstruct the cosmos. This would have been the quantum cosmology version of the Hegelian infinite judgment: the entire external cosmos equals (or is correlative to) the observer’s eye.

What these counterintuitive thoughts imply is that philosophy returns with a vengeance in today’s quantum physics. The old question not just ignored but outright prohibited by Bohr and the Copenhagen orthodoxy (what is the ontological status of wave functions?) is today answered by the claim that quantum waves describe “the world at some kind of preexistence level” (88) since what exists in/as our reality is only the outcomes of the collapse of the quantum superpositions. At this preexistence level, particles “follow all possible paths when they move from one point to another” (90): in a double-slit experiment, “individual electrons follow not one but every possible path from the gun to the screen. One path takes the electron through the left slit, another through the right, back out through the left, into a U-turn, and through the right slit once more.” (91)

(Could we not say the same also about how a subject’s sexual identity is formed? It (mostly) “collapses” into a particular form (gay, hetero man, lesbian…), but to understand how this form emerged we have to accept that the subject enacted all possible forms, and that these “superposed” forms continue to echo in the final form.[2]) Alenka Zupančič wrote: “In theatre, we start with ‘repetitions,’ for rehearsals are called repetitions, and we end up with la première, with the first (performance or the first night). Repetitions do not repeat some first occurrence but, rather, lead up to it.”[3] Can we say, in a similar way, that wave superpositions are like theatrical repetitions which prepare he (back)ground for the premiere in their collapse?

Such paradoxes surprisingly induced Hawking (who otherwise despised philosophy) to return to it: “We need a new philosophy for cosmology.” (167) “/…/ a proper quantum outlook /onto the universe/ will lead to a different philosophy of cosmology in which we work from the top down, backward in time, starting from the surface of our observation.” (175) Can we apply the top-down approach to universe itself, so that it has multiple pasts? Hawking’s final answer is yes – the premise of his new philosophy is that we should abandon the idea that “the universe has a global classical state. We live in a quantum universe so it should be described by a superposition of histories a la Feynman, each with its own probability.” (174) Or, to quote Hertog’s paraphrase:
“we should adopt a full-blown quantum view not just of what’s happening within the universe – the wave functions of particles and strings and so forth – but of the cosmos as a whole. /…/ we should think of the universe as a superposition of many possible spacetimes. So a quantum universe is uncertain even on the very largest scales, on scales well beyond our cosmological horizon like those associated with eternal inflation. And that large-scale cosmic fuzziness puts a bomb under the eternal background that the multiverse aficionados assume exists.” (174)
This means that we shouldn’t imagine the Big Bang as a singularity that then explodes but as a primordial fuzziness in which time bends into space (130), or, as Hertog quotes Wagner’s Parsifal, “I hardly move, yet far I seem to have come. You see, son, here time becomes space /zum Raum wird hier die Zeit.” (72) Or, to quote Hertog, “in the very early universe, quantum effects would have blurred the very distinction between space and time, causing them to suffer a bit of an identity crisis, with intervals of time sometimes behaving like intervals of space and vice versa.” (94) The singularity at the bottom of the classical universe, that event without a cause that seemingly put the beginning outside science, is therefore replaced by “a smooth and rounded quantum origin complying with the laws of physics everywhere.” (95)

The fact that there is no pure singularity of the absolute beginning where all the laws of nature break down implies a further radically counterintuitive conclusion: there is no zero-level at which things (or, rather processes) just happen without being is some sense observed. Even the remotest past is retroactively generated by an observer: “What matters is not what is most probable in the theory but what is most probable to be observed. Cosmological histories that don’t produce observers don’t quite count when we compare our theories to our observations.” (127) However, are there different universes for different observers? How do we locate ourselves in this multitude of observers? “Einstein showed that gravity is a manifestation of warped spacetime. Holography goes further and postulates that warped spacetime is woven from quantum entanglement.” (235) In what precise sense do entanglements occur only for observers?

Let’s begin with the notion of entropy, a concept that is most commonly associated with a state of disorder, randomness, or uncertainty. Entropy is central to the second law of thermodynamics, which states that the entropy of an isolated system left to spontaneous evolution cannot decrease with time. As a result, isolated systems evolve toward thermodynamic equilibrium, where the entropy is highest. A consequence of the second law of thermodynamics is that such processes are irreversible. In 1928, Arthur Eddington endeavored to explain the nature of time, order, and the universe in terms of entropy: “If you take a pack of cards as it comes from the maker and shuffle it for a few minutes, all traces of the original systematic order disappears. The order will never come back however long you shuffle. There is only one law of nature – the second law of thermodynamics – which recognizes a distinction between the past and the future. Its subject is the random element in a crowd. A practical measure of the random element which can increase in the universe but never decrease is called entropy.” In this way Eddington offers a thermodynamic explanation of time’s arrow: a direction of time emerges from irreversible growing entropy.

Along these lines, Carlo Rovelli claims that time is an effect of our ignorance: we cannot see it all, we cannot access a total view of reality: “if I could take into account all the details of the exact, microscopic state of the world, would the characteristic aspects of the flowing of time disappear? Yes. If I observe the microscopic state of things, then the difference between past and future vanishes.”[4] Why? Because the changes regulated by physical laws are “symmetric between future and past.” (30) Again, why? Because of the growing entropy from the past to the future: “The entire difference between past and future may be attributed solely to the fact that the entropy of the world was low in the past.” (125) However, entropy (growing disorder) appears only if we measure a starting point as that of order – “every configuration is particular, every configuration is singular, if we look at all of its details.” (29) Rovelli evokes here a short science-fiction novel (co-authored by Alain Connes and two of his friends) in which Charlotte, the protagonist, “manages to have for a moment a totality of information about the world, without blurring. She manages to ‘see’ the world directly, beyond time,” (123) and when she is gradually returning to our blurred image of reality, she falls back into time. But does quantum indeterminacy not imply that reality is in itself blurred, “muddled,” so that the limitation of our observations is grounded in the incompleteness of reality itself? Rovelli generally opposes “our confused fantasies about the supposed freedom of the future,” (48) but he himself wrote: “The intrinsic quantum indeterminacy of things produces a blurring which ensures – contrary to what classic physics seemed to indicate – that the unpredictability of the world is maintained even if it were possible to measure everything that is measurable.” (123) And, to risk even a step further, does this “unpredictability” not point – not towards freedom but – towards some kind of openness of the future?

This unpredictability means the unpredictability of the collapse of a wave function, and the big problem that haunts the entire history of quantum physics is: how does this collapse happen? In the multiple-worlds interpretation of the quantum mechanics, the ontological gap between quantum waves and our ordinary reality disappears: there are only quantum waves with all their superposed versions actualized. Based on this insight, Sean Carroll postulated that from an (impossible) objective view, we could give a full deterministic description of reality; the problem is only that we would not know to which of the multiple worlds we belong, i.e., where we (observers) are located in this multitude of worlds. Is this not the problem with the Cartesian cogito? The subject reduced to a pure observer has no place in mechanically-determined external reality, and it exists as subject only if it has no place in it. Lacan knew this when he wrote that modern science is based on the foreclosure of the subject… How to resolve this paradox? Again, we should posit that the objective view which would give a full deterministic description of reality is not only inaccessible to us because of our finitude (because we are part of reality), but – much more radically – because reality is in itself not all, because it doesn’t exist as a totality with no immanent barrier.

Rovelli knows this, which is why he defines reality as a multiplicity of worlds each of which is rooted in the point-of-view of a particular observer – there is no “independent” reality. Rovelli is also right to reject the idea that this multiplicity implies a version of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum oscillations; however, he seems to get caught in the traditional philosophical paradox when he argues that “it is impossible for a system to have information about itself because it requires it to stand in a particular correlation to itself and this is not possible. It is not a new idea that quantum mechanics cannot describe the observers.” (102) So if “in RQM /relational quantum mechanics/ it does not make sense to claim that the whole universe is in a state of entanglement because, by being part of it, we cannot interact with it by definition,” (104) do we not here stumble upon the old problem—is a set a part of itself?—in a new guise? Are we not back at the well-known liar paradox? If my statement “I am always lying” is true, then this statement itself is a lie since it implies that I am not always lying, etc. Lacan offer a solution here, distinguishing between the content of an enunciation and the subjective stance of enunciation implied by it: “I am always lying” can correctly render my experience of my entire existence as inauthentic, as a fake. However, the opposite also holds: the statement “I know I am a piece of shit” can in itself be literally true but false at the level of the subjective stance it pretends to render since it implies that, by saying it, I somehow demonstrate that I am NOT fully “a piece of shit,” that I am honest about myself… But have these psychological finesses anything to do with the quantum universe?

If, as Rovelli repeatedly claims, there is no object, no element of reality, which is not observed, if objects exist only in relation to an observer, as relative to that observer, then the fact that “it does not make sense to claim that the whole universe is in a state of entanglement” means that one should abandon the very notion of the “whole universe.” This doesn’t imply that there is something outside the universe – it’s just that the universe cannot be totalized since, to do this, an external observer is needed. The non-totalizability of the universe thus implies a negative limit (boundary), a limit outside which there is nothing. So I, as a part of the universe, can claim that there is nothing in the universe that is not entangled and that, located at this boundary, I am this nothing. I cannot be just a part of the universe: the whole world “collapses” in me as an observer, i.e., in one of its parts.

To put it in yet another way, when RQM posits that quantum events exist only in interactions and that the character of each quantum event is only relative to the system involved in the interaction, so that different observers can give different accounts of the actuality of the same physical property, i.e., when it claims that the occurrence of an event is not something absolutely real or not, but is only real in relation to a specific observer, are these and similar claims universally true (true independently of any observer) or are they also valid only in relation to a specific (human) observer? The only way to assert their universal validity without presupposing a global external observer is to base such universal claims on an immanent limitation or boundary of reality itself.

This limitation brings us to the first conclusion of special relativity theory: there is no global simultaneity, no NOW that encompasses the entire universe. If you observe with a telescope a person on a planet four light years from the Earth, what you see is what she was doing four years ago on that planet. So, can you say that she is doing now on that planet what she will be doing for years after you (in your now) observe her from the Earth? No, because four years after you have seen her through the telescope, in her time, “she might already have returned to Earth and could be ten terrestrial years in the future (measured by the Earthly time).” (39) So between my past – the events that happened before what I can witness (in my) now – and my future – the events that will happen after my now – “there is an interval that is neither past nor future, and still has a duration. It is an expanded present (15 minutes on Mars, millions of years in the Andromeda galaxy…).

There is, nevertheless, an aspect of time that has survived the demolition of the Newtonian theory of time: the world is nothing but change; it is not a collection of things, it is a collection of events. These events are “in a where but also in a when. They are spatially but also temporarily delimited: they are events.” (87) The only limitation is that “we cannot arrange the universe like a single orderly sequence of times”(99): “In the world, there is change, there is a temporal structure of relations between events that is anything but illusory. It is not a global happening. It is a local and complex one which is not amenable to being described in terms of a single global order.” (100)

If the “true reality” of fields and waves is out of time and space, then time and space are in some basic sense illusory. However, isn’t the underlying scheme of basic reality and illusory appearances false in the same way as its opposite, the gradual progress towards higher forms? What pushes this pre-ontological quantum space towards collapses and/or towards our common reality must be some immanent impossibility, a “barred One,” or some “boundary” (beyond which there is nothing – a boundary which coincides with its Beyond, i.e., which is itself inaccessible) in the basic quantum space itself.

To go back to our main line, the fundamental theory of the world “does not need a time variable: it needs to tell us only how the things that we see in the world vary with respect to each other.” (103-4) OK, but “the things that we see in the world” are always perceived by us as things that exist in space and time:
“From our perspective – the perspective of a creatures who make up a small part of the world – we see the world flowing in time. Our interaction with the world is partial, which is why we see it in a blurred way. To this blurring is added quantum indeterminacy.” (169)
I detect here a certain ambiguity: the first factor (the limitation of our perspective) makes the world appear blurred to us, so that we can still imagine how from a complete global perspective the world is not blurred, but the quantum indeterminacy makes it blurred IN ITSELF. This brings us back to entropy: the illusion of a single line of the flow of time is (to simplify things to the utmost) the outcome of the fact that we all (humanity) share the same perspective of living in a world of growing entropy. Entropy also explains why we remember the past and not the future: it is not simply because the future didn’t yet happen but because the flow of time is based on the growing entropy – entropy was lower in the past, and (what appears from OUR standpoint) as the greater order of things in the past leaves traces in our present. Since our future is based on growing disorder, it cannot leave traces to us: “The fact is that the origin of our sensation of being able to act freely in the world, choosing between different futures, even though we are unable to act upon the past.” (144-145)

A further problem I see here is: if every encounter/interaction counts as observation, does this not mean that collapses are infinite since entities are processes of change existing only in interaction with others? For Rovelli, an entity is exposed to multiple interactions and in every interaction it “collapses” into a different determined object (into a different eigenstate) – in itself, this object is just a mess of quantum wave oscillations. But, again, if collapse occurs in all encounters, even between two particles, not just in observations in any narrower sense, then collapses happens all the time continuously, trillions of trillions, more than particles – they are in no way exceptional Events. So was Sabine Hossenfelder right when she wrote that our universe is basically deterministic, with just small margins of uncertainty at the subatomic level which do not affect the larger-scale reality?

If every interaction counts as observation that causes a collapse, and if things exist only in their interrelations, does this not mean that all that exists are determined “collapsed” objects? “The world is like a collection of interrelated points of view. To speak of the world ‘seen from outside’ makes no sense because there is no ‘outside’ to the world.” (109) We thus arrive at the problem of Wigmer’s Friend: does the observation of the all of interaction of an object with its observer imply that collapses can also be superposed, that an object/event X contains a multiplicity of collapses, not only because it interacts with multiple “observers” but because this interaction itself is observed by multiple agents? To quote Rovelli again: “Each part of the world interacts with a small part of all the variables, the value of which determines ‘the state of the world with regard to that particular subsystem’.” (136) So, again, the world is like a collection of interrelated points of view, each of which is in some sense universal since it renders the entire world from a singular point of view.

But, again, what counts as an observation? Relying on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and quantum physics, Roger Penrose maintained that consciousness is not computational, that it cannot be explained on the model of a computer, and claimed that we have to evoke another more fundamental dimension to account for it. Gödel’s theorems are concerned with the limits of provability in formal axiomatic theories. The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an effective procedure (i.e., an algorithm) is capable of proving all truths about the arithmetic of natural numbers. The second theorem, an extension of the first, shows that the system cannot demonstrate its own consistency. From a Hegelo-Lacanian standpoint, a different solution imposes itself: what if, staying with Gödel, we posit that there is no need to go beyond because consciousness is grounded in a deadlock of computation, that it is an effect of computation stumbling upon a limit (a limit beyond which there is nothing)? Is there not a vague homology between this idea and Heidegger’s point (in his analysis of our everyday use of things in Sein und Zeit) that we become fully aware of tools only when they malfunction? I use a hammer thoughtlessly relying on my practice and habitudes, but I become aware of it when, say, its weighted “head” detaches itself from a long handle after I swing it too strongly?

Penrose draws on the basic properties of quantum computing: bits (qubits) of information can be in multiple states – for instance, in the “on” or “off” position – at the same time. These quantum states exist simultaneously – in a “superposition” – before coalescing into a single, almost instantaneous, calculation. Quantum coherence occurs when a huge number of things – say, a whole system of electrons – act together in one quantum state. What has this to do with our consciousness? Penrose refers here to Stuart Hameroff’s idea that quantum coherence happens in microtubules, protein structures inside the brain’s neurons. Microtubules are tubular structures inside eukaryotic cells (part of the cytoskeleton) that play a role in determining the cell’s shape, as well as its movements, which includes cell division – separation of chromosomes during mitosis. Hameroff suggests that microtubules are the quantum device that Penrose had been looking for in his theory. In neurons, microtubules help control the strength of synaptic connections, and their tube-like shape might protect them from the surrounding noise of the larger neuron. The microtubules’ symmetry and lattice structure are of particular interest to Penrose. He believes that “this reeks of something quantum mechanical”:
“what’s going on in the brain must be taking advantage not just of quantum mechanics, but where it goes wrong. It’s where quantum mechanics needs to be superseded.” So we need a new science that doesn’t yet exist? “That’s right. Exactly.”[5]
There are three problems with this account. First, a large majority of scientists reject Hameroff’s idea of microtubules as quantum devices. Second, although Hameroffs’ notion of microtubules is materialist (it describes what goes on in our brain), his overall view is idealist (to put it bluntly, he thinks consciousness is an immaterial spiritual substance), while “Penrose is an atheist who calls himself ‘a very materialistic and physicalist kind of person,’ and he’s bothered by New Agers who’ve latched onto quantum theories about non-locality and entanglement to prop up their paranormal beliefs.”[6] However, Penrose also seems to oscillate with regard to this point, claiming that proto-consciousness is everywhere:
“An element of proto-consciousness takes place whenever a decision is made in the universe. I’m not talking about the brain. I’m talking about an object which is put into a superposition of two places. Say it’s a speck of dust that you put into two locations at once. Now, in a small fraction of a second, it will become one or the other. Which does it become? Well, that’s a choice. Is it a choice made by the universe? Does the speck of dust make this choice? Maybe it’s a free choice. I have no idea.”[7]
And in some passages, Penrose goes to the end of this road and draws the idealist conclusion: “Somehow, our consciousness is the reason the universe is here.”[8] We thus find ourselves at the opposite end of Ravelli for whom “observation” which collapses a quantum superposition has nothing to do with consciousness since it occurs in any material interaction of different particles.

So how to navigate between these two extremes? Of special interest are here attempts to define the modes of cognition which do not involve any conscious self-awareness, not even the one that is sometimes attributed to highly developed animals. In an overview of the existing literature, Michael Marder convincingly argues that “plants are res cogitantes extendentes”: “plants are constantly extending their cognition through the active extension of their bodies, and, with it, their functional cognitive apparatuses. And beyond that, plants also actively extend their cognitive process to the environment they are constantly engaged with and which houses a wide array of their biochemical substances.” Such an anti-Cartesian approach (rejecting the ontological distinction between res cogitans and res extensa) has nothing whatsoever to do with any New Age vitalist obscurantism – it remains firmly in the space of scientific materialism.

Third problem: where precisely does consciousness enter here? Is it the space of superpositions as such or does it designate the moment of collapse, of a choice when, “in a small fraction of a second, it will become one or the other”? From a Lacano-Schellingian standpoint an immediate counter-argument imposes itself: but why the identification of (free) decision with consciousness? Are basic decisions not unconscious? What is missing in Penrose’s mental space in which there are physical processes and consciousness is thus simply the Freudian unconscious. This is also why we should abandon the option that superpositions are unconscious, while consciousness enters at the moment of decision which causes the collapse of superpositions: decisions are unconscious, consciousness just takes note of them.

The price Matteo Smerlak and Rovelli are ready to pay for this relational view[9] is that they reject the predominant view, according to which the violations of Bell’s theorem provide a proof of non-locality, and claim that their version of RQM enables us to save locality: “it is not necessary to abandon locality in order to account for EPR correlations. From the relational perspective, the apparent ‘quantum non-locality’ is a mistaken illusion caused by the error of disregarding the quantum nature of all physical systems.” First, what is locality? “We call locality the principle demanding that two spatially separated events cannot have instantaneous mutual influence. We will argue that this is not contradicted by EPR type correlations, if we take the relational perspective on quantum mechanics.” The basic axiom of RQM is that physical reality is
“formed by the individual quantum events (facts) through which interacting systems (objects) affect one another. Quantum events are therefore assumed to exist only in interactions and (this is the central point) the character of each quantum event is only relative to the system involved in the interaction. /…/ different observers can give different accounts of the actuality of the same physical property. This fact implies that the occurrence of an event is not something absolutely real or not, but it is only real in relation to a specific observer. Notice that, in this context, an observer can be any physical system. /…/ The preferred Copenhagen observer is relativized into the multiplicity of observers, formed by all possible physical systems, and therefore it no longer escapes the laws of quantum mechanics.”
In the EPR situation, we have precisely such a case: each of the two entangled particles is measured by a separate observer (A and B), so that
“A and B can be considered two distinct observers, both making measurements on α and β. The comparison of the results of their measurements /…/ cannot be instantaneous, that is, it requires A and B to be in causal contact. More importantly, with respect to A, B is to be considered as a normal quantum system (and, of course, with respect to B, A is a normal quantum system). /…/ this does not mean that B and A cannot communicate their experience. In fact, in either account the possibility of communicating experiences exists and in either account consistency is ensured. Contradiction emerges only if, against the main stipulation of RQM, we insist on believing that there is an absolute, external account of the state of affairs in the world, obtained by juxtaposing actualities relative to different observers.”
In this precise sense, Smerlak and Rovelli distance themselves from Einstein while pointing out that “Einstein’s original motivation with EPR was not to question locality, but rather to question the completeness of QM, on the basis of a firm confidence in locality”:
“RQM is complete in the sense of exhausting everything that can be said about nature. However, in a sense RQM can be interpreted as the discovery of the incompleteness of the description of reality that any single observer can give: A can measure the pointer variable of B, but the set of the events as described by B is irreducibly distinct from the set of events as described by A. In this particular sense, RQM can be said to show the “incompleteness” of single–observer Copenhagen QM. Then Einstein’s intuition that the EPR correlations reveal something deeply missing in Copenhagen quantum mechanics can be understood as being correct: the incompleteness of Copenhagen QM is the disregard of the quantum properties of all observers, which leads to paradoxes as the apparent violation of locality exposed by EPR.”
How does this line of argumentation account for the fact that, in the case of entangled particles, if A measures the spin of one of the particles, he can know what the spin of the other particle is without even waiting for a message from B who will measure this spin? Or, more modestly, how can he know what any other observer who will measure the spin of the other particle will see?

If we universalize relationality and define every part of reality as depending on an observer (so that the same part of reality not only appears different but is different for different observers), do we not get stuck in a rather flat global view akin to the first feature of dialectical materialism formulated by Stalin: every entity is caught in a complex network of relations, things do not exist alone in separation from each other… Or, to complicate things further: when A and B interact, are they BOTH not at the same time observers of the other and observed by the other? So why do we even need an external observer who registers the interaction? Do the two interacting particles not already observe each other?

A naïve but correct philosophical counterpoint arises here: if everything is relative, if it is what it is only relationally, with regard to an observer, does this entire network not float in the air? In order not to collapse into itself, does this network not need to rely on some form of Absolute? The answer is: yes, but this Absolute is not some reality-in-itself beyond all observations. It can only be a negative foundation: the LIMIT itself, a limit beyond which there is nothing. In the same way as, in structuralism, differentiality can only function through a pure difference, in quantum relationality the fact that every entity is grounded in being observed implies that not everything can be observed, but this unobservable is not an external not-observed positive reality; it is the limit of observation itself.

It is in this sense that “RQM is realist about the existence of quantum entities, even though it is antirealist about the wave function”: wave function superpositions are just an instrument for calculating probabilities as they appear to an observer of a quantum entity, not part of the observed reality… Here we stumble upon the basic philosophical question: when we claim that a theory should fit reality, WHAT do we mean by this reality? When asked about an underlying quantum world, Bohr allegedly answered: “There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about Nature.” So all we are effectively dealing with are parts of our everyday reality: numbers on the screen of a measuring apparatus, etc. But is such a view not all too easy? It is difficult to avoid the question: why do QM predictions hold? (QM is the most successfully tested theory in the history of science.) Even more, wave superpositions are not just possibilities: the point of quantum mechanics is that possibilities have AS SUCH an actuality and influence the outcome – in some cases, the only way to account for a measuring is to assume that a particle took all possible superposed paths. Or, as Nikki Weststeijn put it in a concise way:
“In RQM the wave function is understood as a book-keeping device that tracks what will happen upon the next interaction. It encodes any previous interaction that A has had with system S and allows A to predict the state of S with respect to A in the future.”
It is thus “a bookkeeping device instead of a representation of a real physical quality.” However, is it necessary for RQM that the wave function does not represent any real physical quantity? “If we say that the wave function does not represent a real physical quantity, the question then remains what the underlying physical quantity is that in some way gives rise to the wave function.” In short, “in order to give a coherent interpretation, RQM should take the wave function to represent a real physical quantity, albeit a relative quantity.”[10]

The collapse of superpositions effectuated by a measurement asserts the duality of quantum reality and ordinary reality. Do all the paradoxes displayed by the measurement of quantum processes not impose a rather obvious conclusion: beyond/beneath our ordinary spatio-temporal reality there is (not a timeless spiritual domain but) another level of reality where the laws of our spatio-temporal reality do not apply (where a particle can take many paths simultaneously, where two entangled particles can be in contact instantaneously, faster than the speed of light, etc.)? This duality is not complementary (in the traditional sense of the term) since it concerns two totally incompatible levels of reality – the two levels are related like the two dimensions of a parallax. Here, Lacan’s logic of non-all can be of some use: our ordinary reality forms an All grounded in an exception (the observer who causes the collapse of superpositions), while quantum reality requires no exception, yet it is for that very reason not-all, and the impossibility that makes it non-all pushes the network of superpositions towards collapse. So what if, in order to grasp this duality, we use Lacan’s difference between the two forms of assertion: an X exists or there is (something of) X (il y a de…)? Lacan’s examples: “la Femme n’existe pas” (the Woman doesn’t exist”) and “il n’y a pas de grand Autre” (there is no big Other). The second negation is stronger: although the Woman doesn’t exist, there is (something of) the women… Similarly, a single reality that arises through the collapse of a wave superpositions exists while there are superpositions which do not properly exist.

Rovelli’s pluralistic and perspectivalist view of QM is best rendered by the following this quite striking quotation: “if we want to get a true idea of what a point of space-time is like we should look outward at the universe…The complete notion of a point of space-time in fact consists of the appearance of the entire universe as seen from that point.”[11] The determination between a subsystem of the universe and the universe itself is perfectly symmetrical: it is true that the nature of such a local subsystem (“space-time point”) depends on the way it interacts with, or “reflects”, the universe from its particular perspective (and this seems a partial concession to monism), but in RQM there is no Leibnizian “monad of the monads” because “the cosmos can only be described from some local physical system. The problem with priority monism is that it concentrates exclusively on the dependence of a part on the whole, neglecting completely the converse type of dependence.” This converse dependence (all in a part) is crucial.

Muciño, E. Okon and D. Sudarsky’s essay “Assessing Relational Quantum Mechanics” deals with the general ambiguity problem that affects standard quantum theory when deprived of special roles for measuring devices or observers: “within RQM, the breakdown of unitarity is not brought about by mysterious quantum jumps. Instead, it is a consequence of the fact that it is impossible to give a full description of an interaction in which one is involved.” This is a truly ingenious solution: wave collapse happens because of the impossibility of a full description that would include the observer measuring a quantum state. So, in a properly dialectical tension, waves collapse locally because they cannot collapse globally.

Notes:

[1] See Thomas Hertog, On the Origin of Time, London: Penguin 2023. Numbers in brackets that follow indicate the pages of this book.

[2] I owe this thought to Jacqueline Rose.

[3] Alenka Zupančič, The Odd One In: On Comedy, Cambridge: MIT Press 2008, p. 171.

[4] Carlo Rovelli, The Order of Time, London: Penguin 2019, p. 30. Numbers in brackets that follow indicate the pages of this book.

[5] Quoted from Roger Penrose On Why Consciousness Does Not Compute – Nautilus.

[6] Quoted from op.cit.

[7] Quoted from op.cit.

[8] Quoted from op.cit.

[9] See 0604064.pdf (arxiv.org). Non-assigned quotes that follow are from this source.

[10] Weststeijn, op.cit. One should thus not confuse the pre-ontological Real-in-itself implied by the quantum theory (a Real composed of quantum processes) with the pre-ontological Real that we find in Lynch’s or Tarkovsky’s films (an impenetrable density which ultimately remains fantasmatic/imaginary.

[11] Barbour J. (1982), “Relational concepts of space and time”, Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 33, p. 265.